


















Peter A. Groothuis 
Associate Professor  
Department of Economics 
Appalachian State University 






James Richard Hill 
Professor 
Department of Economics 
Central Michigan University 






   2
 
 
Abstract: Using a panel study of annual Major League Baseball data (1990-2004) we do 
not find evidence of exit discrimination against African-American players in Major 
League Baseball. Our findings are inconsistent with results from a study by Jiobu (1988)  
using 1971-1985 data which found that race decreased career length, ceteris paribus, for 
black players but not Hispanics. Our results are consistent with recent findings that 
failed to find evidence of exit discrimination in the NBA using data from the 1990s. In our 
semi-parametric duration analysis, we find that performance variables are important in 
determining career length. We find no evidence that race affects the career duration of 
black hitters. Past research had suggested that discrimination by majority, white fans led 
owners in sports to keep less talented white players on rosters. Our results suggest that 
team owners in the pursuit of championships keep talented players regardless of race. 
This is an affirmation of Becker's theoretical implications of market competition 
overcoming discrimination.    3
Introduction 
  The topic of discrimination in labor markets has attracted a great deal of research 
by economists over time. From the theoretical constructs developed by Gary Becker 
(1971) to the development of the residual method by Ronald Oaxaca (1973) economists 
have struggled to determine the cause and effects of prejudice on minority workers. 
Professional sports have provided a fertile field for researchers of this topic because of 
the abundance of performance data and salary information available.  In Lawrence 
Kahn’s 1991 article on discrimination in professional sports he reviews empirical 
findings from numerous articles published between 1972 and 1989. He divides his 
summaries under four major headings: salary discrimination, positional discrimination, 
customer discrimination, and hiring discrimination. Many of the articles offered findings 
on more than one of the topic headings. 
  Salary discrimination drew the most attention. Twenty four articles with empirical 
work on this topic are critiqued by Kahn (1991): twelve on baseball, eight on basketball, 
and two each on football and hockey.  The strongest evidence of salary discrimination 
against black athletes comes from studies of the NBA based on data from the 1984-1986 
timeframe. However more recent research (Hill (2004) and Bodvarsson and Brastow 
(1999)) has failed to find salary discrimination in the NBA using data from the 1990s. 
Twelve articles involving research on positional segregation were reviewed (Kahn 1991): 
five from baseball, three from football, two from basketball, and two from hockey.   
Evidence suggested positional segregation or stacking existed for blacks in baseball and 
football; evidence also suggested that blacks were underrepresented at the center and 
forward position in the NBA. Customer discrimination was the main or auxiliary focus in 
fifteen of the papers (Kahn 1991): nine from basketball and six from baseball. Results are 
mixed for attendance at NBA games; a recent article (Kanazawa and Funk (2001)) finds a 
negative correlation between the percentage of blacks on the roster and cable TV ratings.   4
In baseball, evidence from mid-1970s revenue data fails to find customer discrimination 
but studies using earlier data did. Customer discrimination also appears to exist in the 
baseball trading card market (Nardinelli and Simon (1989)). 
  Of the thirteen pieces of empirical work focused on hiring discrimination 
reviewed by Kahn (1991), six deal with data from baseball, four with basketball, two 
with hockey, and one with football. Findings failed to confirm hiring barriers for black 
athletes in basketball and baseball; whites with inferior performances were not hired over 
superior black athletes. However, Johnson and Marple (1973) found evidence from 1970-
71 NBA data that marginal white players had longer careers than marginal black players. 
Hoang and Rascher (1999) explored the concept of racially-based retention barriers in the 
NBA in more detail using data from the 1980s. They, too, found evidence that, holding 
performance constant, there was “exit discrimination” in the NBA. Groothuis and Hill 
(2004) failed to confirm Hoang and Rascher’s results using more recent data, height as an 
added explanatory variable,  and a duration model that allowed for both stock and flow 
samples. 
  Jiobu (1988) found evidence that race decreased career length, ceteris paribus, for 
black players but not Hispanics using Major League baseball from 1971-1985 data. The 
purpose of this article is determine if Jiobu’s findings can be replicated using more recent 
baseball data and a richer duration model that has season-variant data; Jiobu used only 
unchanging, career performance variables in his model. Exit discrimination is more 
subtle than positional segregation or pay discrimination. If exit discrimination in Major 
League baseball is no longer present it would seem to affirm  Becker's theoretical 
implications that market competition will eliminate discrimination over time. 
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Theory 
  Discrimination in the labor market implies that certain individuals or groups of 
workers are somehow treated differently than others unrelated to ability or performance; 
in the literature on professional sports the focus has been on differential treatment of 
black and Hispanic players. The differential treatment can occur in a variety of formats. 
When pay discrimination occurs workers in the group receiving the unequal treatment 
receive lower pay than others for the same performance level.  Most researchers believe 
pay discrimination against black players in professional baseball was eventually 
eliminated by free agency and salary arbitration in the mid-1970s (Hill and Spellman 
(1984) and Cymrot (1985).  
  Hoang and Rascher (1999) define exit discrimination as “the involuntary 
dismissal of workers based on the preferences of employers, coworkers, or customers.”  
Jiobu (1988) and Hoang and Rascher (1999) concluded that career length for black 
players in Major League baseball and the NBA respectively were lower than their white 
counterparts, ceteris paribus. While Jiobu does not make any calculations on the impact 
of exit discrimination on career earnings, Hoang and Rascher (1999) conclude that this 
form of discrimination led to almost a two and a half times greater decrease in black 
career pay compared to the more heavily analyzed form of pay discrimination. 
  Becker (1971) suggests that the source of the personal prejudice that leads to 
various forms of labor market discrimination may be employers, coworkers or customers.  
Recent research by Kahn and Sherer (1988) on pay discrimination in the NBA and Hoang 
and Rascher (1999) on exit discrimination in the NBA has focused on customers as the 
source of the prejudice; both studies found empirical evidence to support the existence of 
customer discrimination.  The pay premium for white players was explained by the   6
higher value of their performances compared to black players because of the prejudiced 
preferences of white, majority fans.  
Hoang and Rascher (1999, p.74)) hypothesized:  
  “To satisfy the fans, there is a minimum number of white players on a team. The 
second assumption, that the pool of quality available talent is becoming increasingly 
black, causes annual replacement of players with rookies to occur mostly among black 
players. The white players have longer careers simply because there are fewer qualified 
white rookies to replace them,…” 
 
In his study of exit discrimination in Major League baseball, Jiobu (1988, p.532) does not 
specifically test for customer discrimination but he does state:   
“Perhaps, motivated by the concern that white fans will not support a predominantly 
black team, management has silently placed an “invisible ceiling” on the black 
percentage. When coupled with the desire to have a winning team, this ceiling would 
generate strong pressures to (a) employ as many black players as possible in order to 
capitalize on their performance, but (b) in order to remain under the ceiling, to eliminate 
black players as soon as their performance declined, and (c) to retain white players of 
declining but similar ability.” 
 
 
 Research on this topic assumes that all turnover is involuntary; Kahn (1991, p. 
406) argues that the high salaries paid in sports make voluntary quits unlikely. Thus these 
studies are essentially survival models. If white players have longer careers than black 
players with similar performance statistics then exit discrimination is said to exist. 
Data 
Our data includes all individuals, both hitters and pitchers, who participated in 
Major League Baseball from 1990 through 2004 for a fifteen-year panel consisting of  
3185 players. Jiobu’s (1988) study on exit discrimination in baseball only looked at 
hitters. To capture the overall length of players' baseball careers our data consists of both 
stock and flow samples.  (See figure 1.) A stock sample consists of all ongoing careers at 
the start of the panel in 1990.  These left-censored data are easily included because we 
know how many years each player had played in the Majors prior to 1990.  Our stock 
sample consists of 690 players who had an average tenure of six years as they entered the   7
1990 season.  Including a stock sample captures information on players who careers are 
longer than the panel data set.  Using only stock data, however, would under represent 
short-career players, so we also include flow data. 
  A flow sample includes all careers that start between 1990 and 2004.  This sample 
captures many short careers in Major League Baseball.  Including only flow data 
however would allow for no careers longer than 15 years, which is the length of our 
panel.  As with most panels our data is also right-censored where many careers were 
ongoing when our sample ended in 2004.  Our right-censored data includes both stock 
and flow observations.  To estimate a duration model of stock and flow data, we use a 
technique developed by Berger and Black (1999). 
  The variables in our data include both season-variant and season-invariant 
data.  Jiobu (1988) used only season-invariant data for his analysis. We report the means 
in Table 1A for hitters and Table 1B for pitchers.  Our season-invariant data include 
dummy variables for player's race, a dummy variable for infielders, first basemen, and 
catchers, and a dummy variable for pitcher’s throwing hand.  Our season-variant data for 
hitters are age and performance data that include games played as well as slugging 
average, stolen base percentage, runs batted in per game, walks per game, strikeouts per 
game, hit by pitch per game, sacrifice flies per game, and runs scored per game. Our 
season-variant data for pitchers are age and performance data that include games played 
as well as earned run average, wins, losses, saves, strikeout-to-walk ratio, and outs in 
innings pitched. In Tables 1A and 1B we report variable means by race.  To determine if 
exit discrimination exits in the Major Leagues we analyze the data using both non-
parametric and semi-parametric techniques. 
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Model: Non-parametric Estimates of Career Duration 
  To help understand career duration in Major League Baseball, we calculate yearly 
hazard functions as: 
(1)          ht = dt / nt , 
where dt is the number of players who end their career in year t and nt is the number of 
players at risk of ending their career in year t.  The hazard rate can be interpreted as the 
percentage of players who exited the MLB given they have survived up to some level of 
tenure.  In table 2, we report the hazard rate for foreign-born Hispanic, black, and white 
hitters. 
In Figure 2 we plot the hazard functions for hitters by race where series 1 is the 
hazard rate for African-American players, series 2 the hazard rate for foreign-born Latino 
players and series 3 is the hazard rate for white players.  All three plots show the hazard 
rate gradually declines for the first seven years of tenure in the MLB and then gradually 
climbs for the remainder of the years.  In addition both hazard plots follow an interesting 
pattern that resembles a u-shape.  In the engineering literature on useful life this hazard 
function shape has become known as the "bathtub" plot.  In this literature, the initial 
downturn is identified as infant mortality, the bottom of the tub due to random failure, 
and the upturn due to wear-out (Bolla 2002).  We suggest that this pattern also explains 
an MLB career with the initial downturn occurring as individuals are sorted from the 
league and the upturn due to wear-out from the physical demands of playing baseball. 
Comparing the three plots shows many crosses.  The hazard plot suggests that the 
hazard rates for black, foreign-born Hispanic, and white players are similar.
1  Interpreting 
the differences in hazard rates as discrimination, however, is misleading.  The problem 
arises for the same reason using differences in median wage is misleading in the wage 
 
1 Hazard rates and plots are available for pitchers as well.  literature: neither method controls for differences due to productivity.  In the next section 
we analyze career duration using semi-parametric techniques to control for differences in 
productivity.  
Model: Semi-parametric Estimates of Career Duration 
  We estimate semi-parametric hazard functions following Berger and Black (1999) 
Groothuis and Hill (2004) and Berger, Black and Scott (2004).  Because our data is at the 
season level we calculate our hazard model as a discrete random variable.  As with Black, 
Berger and Scott (2004), we model the durations of a single spell and assume a 
homogeneous environment so that the length of the spell is uncorrelated with the calendar 
time in which the spell begins.  This assumption lets us treat all the players' tenure as the 
same regardless of when it occurred in the panel study.  For instance, all fourth year 
players are considered to have the same base line hazard regardless of calendar time so a 
fourth year player in 1990 has the same baseline hazard as a fourth year player 1997. 
  To understand how stock data influences a likelihood function we follow the 
notation of Berger, Black, and Scott (2001).  Suppose the probability mass function (pmf) 
of durations is defined as: 
  9
ftx (,, ) β ,  (2)     
 
where t is the duration of the career, x is a vector of performance and personal 
characteristics, and β is a vector of parameters.  Now denote F(t,x,β) as the cumulative 
distribution function; then the probability that a career lasts at least t° years is simply 1 - 
F(t°,x,β).  If we define the hazard function as h(t,x,β) ≡ f(t,x,β) / S(t,x,β) and apply the 
definition of conditional probabilities, we may express the pmf as 
 












 If we have a sample of n observations, {t1, t2, . . ., tn}, the likelihood function of the 
sample is  
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Often it is not possible to observe all careers until they end, hence careers are often right- 
censored.  Let the set A be the set of all observations where the players' careers are 
completed and the set B be the set of all observations where the careers are right 
censored.  In this case A and B are disjoint sets whose union is exactly the set of 
observation.  For the set of right-censored observations, all we know is that the actual 
length of the career is greater than ti, the observed length of the career up through the last 
year.  Because we know that the actual length of the career is longer than we observe then 
the contribution of these observations to the likelihood function is just the survivor 
function, S(ti,xi,β).  Thus, we may write the likelihood function as 
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where equation (5) exploits the property that  .  Equation (5) is 
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  To introduce stock sampling, let the set C be the set of careers that were in 
progress when data collection began.  For these observations, we know that the career i 
has lasted for r years before the panel begins so that the probability that the total career 
length will be t is simply given by 
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) . Because we are sampling careers that are already in progress, these observations enter the 
sample only if the career is at least of length r, and hence we must adjust by the 
conditional probability of the career having length r.  With the addition of these 
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The third term of the right-hand side of equation (7) reflects the adjustment necessary for 
the stock sample that end during our panel.  Because stock-sampled observations, by 
definition, must have survived until tenure r, which they survived until time r provides no 
information; their survival is an artifact of the sampling strategy. 
  Of course, some stock-sampled observations may be right-hand censored.  Let the 
set D be the set of all stock-sampled observations that are also right-hand censored.  An 
example of a career that is both right and left censored would be a player that starts his 
career prior to 1990 and ends his career after 2004.  A stock-sampled observation that is 
right-hand censored at time t occurs with probability 
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so that the likelihood function becomes 
 
(9)    
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 In equation (9), the contribution of censored, stock-sampled observations to the 
likelihood function is strictly from the last two terms; such observations simply provide 
information about the survivor function between (r,t).   
Thus we, as Berger, Black and Scott (2004), have expressed the likelihood 
function as a function of the hazard functions.  All that remains is to specify the form of a 
hazard function and estimate by means of maximum likelihood estimation.  As the hazard 
function is the conditional probability of exiting the MLB given that the MLB career 
lasted until the previous season, the hazard function must have a range from zero to one.  

























which is simply the logit model with intercepts that differ by time periods.   The term ht is 
a baseline hazard function, which is common to all.  The xβ term, determined by the 
player’s personal and productivity characteristics, shifts the baseline hazard function, but 
it affects the baseline hazard function in exactly the same way each period.  Berger and 
Black (1999) consider other hazard functions and find that the results are relatively robust 
across various specifications of the hazard function.  As the logit model is available in 
many software packages, we follow Cox and use the logit model. 
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  The intuition behind equation (10), when using the logit model for the hazard 
function, is relatively simple.  For each year during the survey in which the player is in 
the MLB, the player either comes back for another season or ends his career.   If the 
career ends, the dependent variable takes on a value of one; otherwise, the dependent 
variable is zero.  The player remains in the panel until the player exits the MLB or the 
panel ends.  If the panel ends, we say the worker’s spell is right-hand censored.  Thus a player who begins his MLB career during the panel and plays for 6 years will enter the 
data set 6 times: the value of his dependent variable will be zero for the first 5 years 
(tenure one through five) and be equal to one for the sixth year. 
  To illustrate a stock sample consider another player who enters the panel with 7 
years of MLB job tenure prior to 1990 the first year of the panel, then plays for an 
additional 3 years for a 10 year career.  For this player, we ignore his first 7 years of 
tenure because he is left-hand censored.  As the equation of the likelihood function with 
stock data indicates, the duration of a MLB career prior to the beginning of the panel 
makes no contribution to the value of the likelihood function.  Therefore only years 8 
through 10 will enter the data set with the dependent variable taking on the value zero for 
year 8 and 9 and in the 10
th year it takes on a value of one with this player appearing in 
the data set a total of 3 times.  Note for all players who are right-hand censored, we do 
not know when their career ends so their dependent variables are always coded as zero. 
  Because the players in the panel have varying degrees of job tenure prior to the 
beginning of the panel, we identify the hazard function for both long and short careers.  
The disadvantage to this approach is that the vector γt of equation (10) can be very large.  
In our study it would require 25 dummy variables.  We also run into problems with the 
Cox technique because we have too few players who have long careers.  To simplify the 
computation of the likelihood function and be able to keep the long careers, we simply 
approximate the γt vector with a 5
th order polynomial of player’s tenure, which reduces 
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where φ(t) is a 5
th order polynomial in the worker’s tenure.  Once again, we choose the 
Taylor series approximation technique over using tenure dummies due to the small 
number of observations for high tenures.  This method provides a very flexible 
specification of the baseline hazard, but does impose more restrictions than Cox’s 
model.
2
In Table 3A, we report the estimates for hitters for equation 11. In the model we 
find that the tenure polynomials are jointly significant. In our model of exit, we suggest 
that performance should increase career length.  Owners will keep players who are 
productive.  All our specifications results support this prediction where we find 
performance measures are important in career duration.  In particular the number of 
games played in a season, the number of runs scored per game, slugging percentage, runs 
batted in per game, and stolen base percentage all significantly increase the likelihood of 
remaining in the major league baseball for another season. Strikeouts per game decreases 
duration; it is significant. Walks per game and sacrifice flies per game are improperly 
signed but not significant; hit by a pitch per game is properly signed but not significant. 
Exit probability rises significantly with player age. Both infielders and catchers enjoy 
longer playing careers ceteris paribus than outfielders (excluded category) and first 
basemen. This is not surprising since these positions are viewed more as defensive in 
nature whereas first basemen and outfielders are generally viewed as more offensive 
positions and offensive contributions are already captured by the performance statistics 
included in the model. 
 In our model of exit, we also suggest that race may play a role if white customers 
have a preference to see white players and teams find it difficult to replace white players.  
Our results for hitters, however, do not support this claim.  Only the coefficient for 
 
2 When higher order polynomials of the sixth and seventh power are included results do not change 
suggesting that a fifth order polynomial is flexible enough to capture the influence of the base line hazard.   15
foreign-born Latino players is positive, meaning this attribute increases the probability of 
exit for the time period. However, the coefficient is not significant. The coefficients for 
the other race dummy variables are all negative, indicating members of these groups have 
lower probability of exit. All coefficients are insignificant. In order to convert the 
coefficient into a percentage and focus on the magnitude of the effect we use 100[exp(β) 
-1].  This conversion gives us the percentage difference in hazard rates between whites 
and black, between whites and foreign born Hispanics and between whites and American 
born Hispanics.  We find that black hitters have a 13% percent lower hazard rate than 
white hitters while foreign-born Hispanic hitters have a 15% percent higher hazard rate 
than whites. Asian-born hitters, a very small percentage of the sample, have a 59% lower 
hazard rate than white hitters. All results are statistically insignificant.   
These results are contrary to Jiobu’s finding of exit discrimination for black 
players. Several explanations for the difference in results can be posited. First, our data 
covers a more recent time period. Perhaps competitive market forces have removed this 
vestige of discrimination from Major League Baseball. Second, while our econometric 
technique is similar in nature to that of Jiobu, he used only career performance statistics. 
None of his data varied between seasons. Therefore, his finding of exit discrimination 
rests solely on the higher average career performance statistics of black hitters versus 
white hitters and the average duration of each race. Jiobu finds longer career length on 
average for black hitters but finds a positive and significant coefficient for his black 
dummy variable in the duration analysis. This would seem a foregone conclusion given 
their higher average career statistics and longer career lengths. Our model has yearly 
performance statistics that allow the duration analysis to adjust for the “decay rate” of 
hitter skills.   16
In Table 3B, we report the estimates for pitchers for equation 11. The tenure 
polynomials are jointly significant again.  The coefficients of all of the performance 
measures are properly signed and significant determinants of career duration.  Increases 
in earned run average and losses increase the probability of exit while increase in wins, 
saves, strike-out to walk ratio, outs in innings pitched, and games played decrease the 
probability of exit. Left-handed pitchers enjoy longer careers, ceteris paribus, than right-
handers. As with hitters, exit probability rises with player age. 
Results for the race coefficients are perplexing. The coefficient for the black 
dummy is positive but insignificant; the coefficient for Asian-born players is negative but 
insignificant. The coefficients for Foreign-born Latinos are negative and significant. This 
statistical anomaly is hard to explain; Latino pitchers have longer career lengths than 
warranted by their performance statistics. 
Once again, in order to convert the coefficient into a percentage and focus on the 
magnitude of the effect we use 100[exp(β) -1].  This conversion gives us the percentage 
difference in hazard rates between whites and black.  Here we find that black pitchers 
have a 7.6% percent higher hazard rate than whites although it is insignificant.  On the 
other hand, however, foreign-born Hispanic pitchers have lower hazard rates than white 
pitchers. Foreign-born Hispanic pitchers have a 20.1% lower hazard rate; the difference is 
statistically significant. Asian-born pitchers, a very small percentage of the sample, have 




Our findings are inconsistent with results from a study by Jiobu (1988) in a prominent 
sociology journal (Social Forces) using 1971-1985 data which found that race decreased 
career length, ceteris paribus, for black players but not Hispanics. Our results are   17
consistent with recent findings that failed to find evidence of exit discrimination in the 
NBA using data from the 1990s. In our semi-parametric duration analysis, we find that 
performance variables are important in determining career length. We find not evidence 
that race affects the career duration of black hitters; we find the anomalous result that 
foreign-born Latino pitchers have longer career lengths than warranted by their 
performance statistics. Past research had suggested that discrimination by majority, white 
fans led owners in sports to keep less talented white players on rosters. Our results, with 
the aforementioned anomaly noted, suggest that team owners in the pursuit of 
championships keep talented players regardless of race. This is an affirmation of Becker's 
theoretical implications of market competition overcoming discrimination.   18
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Panel Data of Stock and Flow Data 
Left  censored   Right  censored 
  20  21
Table 1A 
Hitter Panel Data (1990-2004): Means of Variables 
Variables White  Black  Foreign-Born 
Latinos 
Age 29.55  29.82  27.97 
Slugging Average  .394  .404  .395 
Stolen Base Percentage  3.70  10.61  6.17 
Runs Batted In per game  .369  .386  .385 
Walks per game  .295  .313  .261 
Strike-Outs per game  .540  .552  .549 
Hit by Pitch per game  .028  .024  .027 
Sacrifice Flies per game  .026  .025  .025 
Runs Scored per game  .378  .441  .407 
Games 93.02  102.54  98.52 
Infield .397  .204  .493 
Catcher .221  .016  .142 




       Pitcher Panel Data (1990-2004): Means of Variables 
Variables White  Black  Foreign-
Born 
Latinos 
Age  29.08 28.44 27.61 
Earned Run Average  4.731  4.848  4.775 
Wins  4.793 4.789 4.891 
Losses  4.758 4.562 4.763 
Saves  2.316 3.117 2.834 
Strike Out to Walk Ratio 1.903  1.723  1.940 
Outs in innings pitched  256.226  248.789  256.969 
Games  32.49 34.17 34.08 







































































  22Table 2A 
































Tenure White  Black  Latinos 
1  0.182 0.115  0.201 
2  0.130 0.129  0.142 
3  0.109 0.099  0.129 
4  0.101 0.070  0.064 
5  0.130 0.101  0.071 
6  0.070 0.093  0.069 
7  0.069 0.102  0.106 
8  0.151 0.145  0.040 
9  0.174 0.138  0.129 
10  0.128 0.125  0.080 
11  0.212 0.118  0.087 
12  0.276 0.119  0.146 
13  0.247 0.231  0.194 
14  0.375 0.054  0.045 
15  0.303 0.194  0.111 
16  0.333 0.207  0.214 
17  0.375 0.182  0.250 
18  0.308 0.316  0.250 
19  0.300 0.182  0 
20  0.714 0.286   
21  0.667 0.400   
22  1  0   
23    0   
24   0   
25   0   
26   1   
   24
 
TABLE 3A 
Hitter Career Duration Semi-parametric Analysis 
                                                          (1990-2004) 
Variable  Multinomial Logit Model 
Constant  -3.285 
(-5.76) 
Black  -.139 
(1.22) 
Foreign-born Latino  .144 
(1.32) 
Asian-born players  -.911 
(0.80) 
Age  .196 
(9.93) 
Slugging Average  -2.65 
(4.13) 
Stolen Base Percentage  -.044 
(3.60) 
Runs Batted In per game -1.87 
(3.80) 
Walks per game  -.021 
(0.05) 
Strike-Outs per game  .763 
(3.36) 
Hit by Pitch per game  -1.472 
(1.58) 
Sacrifice Flies per game  .772 
(0.35) 
Runs Scored per game  -2.715 
(5.43) 
Games  -.0189 
(12.61) 
Infield  -.441 
(4.41)  
First Base  -.150 
(0.98) 
Catcher  -1.034 
(7.92) 
Likelihood function  -2053.62 
--First through fifth order tenure polynomials are also included to provide for 
general functional form of baseline hazard. They are jointly significant.  





Pitcher Career Duration Semi-parametric Analysis 
                                                          (1990-2004) 
Variable  Multinomial Logit Model 
Constant  -4.82 
(10.20) 
Black  .073 
(0.40) 
Foreign-born Latino  -.225 
(1.97) 
Asian-born players  -.255 
(0.72) 
Age  .170 
(10.14) 
Earned Run Average  .119 
(6.47) 
Wins  -.148 
(5.60) 
Losses  .074 
(3.26) 
Saves  -.048 
(4.11) 
Strikeout-to-Walk Ratio -.351 
(6.83) 
Outs in innings pitched  -.0037 
(4.43) 
Games  -.018 
(6.88) 
Left-handed  -.173 
(2.14) 
Likelihood function  -2425.16 
--First through fifth order tenure polynomials are also included to provide for 
general functional form of baseline hazard. They are jointly significant.  
--The numbers in parentheses are absolute value of t-ratios. 
 